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Abstract—We consider information-theoretic privacy in fed-
erated submodel learning, where a global server has multiple
submodels. Compared to the privacy considered in the conven-
tional federated submodel learning where secure aggregation
is adopted for ensuring privacy, information-theoretic privacy
provides the stronger protection on submodel selection by the
local machine. We propose an achievable scheme that partially
adopts the conventional private information retrieval (PIR) scheme
that achieves the minimum amount of download. With respect
to computation and communication overhead, we compare the
achievable scheme with a nave approach for federated submodel
learning with information-theoretic privacy.
Index Terms—federated learning, federated submodel learning,
private information retrieval
I. INTRODUCTION
As machine learning scales larger, the learning task cannot
be handled by a single machine. As a result, learning with
a number of distributed local machines has been studied for
speeding up the learning process. On the other hand, as
personal training data can be transferred to a global server,
local data protection (security) against the global server has
been considered as a significant issue. For this data security,
federated learning [1] has been proposed, where local ma-
chines only upload their local updates to the global server.
In [2], federated submodel learning has been proposed,
where a global server stores a number of submodels and each
local machine selectively trains a subset of submodels. Due
to this submodel selection, privacy on selecting submodels
should also be considered in federated submodel learning, as
well as the data security. In [2], secure aggregation [3] has
been adopted for the privacy on submodel selection.
In this letter, we consider information-theoretic privacy in
federated submodel learning. In [2], a global server may
take advantage of the fact that the submodels that are not
aggregated by secure aggregation are not chosen by local
machines. On the other hand, information-theoretic privacy
implies that a global machine cannot differentiate a chosen
submodel from all the other submodels. Therefore, the privacy
considered in our work is stronger than that of [2].
For information-theoretic privacy in federated submodel
learning, we consider multiple non-colluding global servers
which do not communicate with each other. Compared to the
single global server case in [2], the assumption of multiple
global servers may be a restriction. However, unlike [2], there
M. Kim and J. Lee are with the Communications and Machine Learn-
ing Lab., Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Seoul Na-
tional University, Seoul, 08826, Korea (e-mail: kmc1222@cml.snu.ac.kr jun-
glee@snu.ac.kr).
is no need to aggregate local machines for ensuring the privacy
on submodel selection. That is, a local machine does not need
to wait for the other local machines for ensuring the privacy.
Considering multiple non-colluding global servers in practi-
cal scenarios, one local machine may participate in several
independent groups (e.g., different companies) for federated
learning and there may be a common set of submodels across
the groups. Since these groups do not communicate with each
other, local machine aggregation across the groups is usually
unavailable. Our work can be applied to this kind of scenarios
and ensures privacy on the submodel selection by one local
machine.
We propose an achievable scheme that exploits the conven-
tional private information retrieval (PIR) [4] technique. In PIR
literature, information-theoretic privacy has been considered
only for downloading. On the other hand, our achievable
scheme also handles the uploading process of federated learn-
ing. Specifically, in the download phase of our achievable
scheme, we adopt a PIR scheme that achieves the min-
imum amount of download for non-colluding servers [5].
With respect to communication and computation overhead, we
compare our achievable scheme with an naive approach for
information-theoretic privacy in federated submodel learning.
Compared to [2], since we assume a single local machine with-
out aggregation, comparison with secure aggregation scheme
proposed in [2] is unfeasible. We prove that our achievable
scheme ensures privacy and characterize the lower bound of
overheads.
Notation : An integer set from 1 to N is denoted by [N ]
and a set from N to M is denoted by [N : M ].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that there are r submodels and each submodel
identically has s parameters. The parameters of all submod-
els are aggregated in a matrix Bt ∈ F
r×s
q whose r rows
{Bt,1,Bt,2, · · ·Bt,r} denote the parameters of r submodels.
The index t in Bt denotes the current iteration. That is,
there were t − 1 model updates in the parameter matrix
Bt before. For the privacy of local machines, the parameter
matrix Bt is encoded into B˜t whose r rows are denoted
by {B˜t,1, B˜t,2, · · · , B˜t,r}. The detail of encoding will be
explained in the next section.
As global servers where the local updates are aggregated,
we assume that there are N non-colluding databases {DBi}
N
i=1
who do not communicate with each other. All of the databases
share the matrix B˜t in a replication-based way. Whereas
the databases share the parameter matrix B˜t, there is an
exclusive data that is stored only in each database, which will
be specified in the next section. We sequentially denote the
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exclusive data for each database by ct−1,1, ct−1,2, · · · , ct−1,N .
Since the databases do not collude each other, each DBi
cannot know the other exclusive data {ct−1,j}j∈[N ]\i.
We denote the local machine at iteration t by Lt. Note
that each iteration is occupied by one local machine. Among
r submodels, we assume that Lt wants to update a specific
submodel whose parameters are given by Bt,d, the dth row
of Bt. At the iteration t, there are three operations of Lt:
downloading, updating, and uploading, which will be specified
in the next section. The privacy of Lt implies that the index d
is concealed from the databases after the aforementioned three
operations. For each database DBi, this privacy constraint can
be expressed as below.
I(d;Qt,i,Ut,i, St,i) = 0, (1)
where Qt,i, Ut,i, and St,i denote the queries that Lt sends to
DBi, local data uploaded from Lt to DBi, and Bt ∪ ct−1,i,
respectively.
With respect to overhead, we consider the communication
overhead and computation overhead for ensuring the privacy
at the iteration t. The communication overhead includes the
amount of download and upload. On the other hand, the
computation overhead includes the amount of computation
for encoding, decoding, training, and updating at the local
machine Lt. We depict the system model in Fig. 1.
III. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
At first, we explain the detail of encoded parameter matrix
B˜t and the exclusive data ct−1,i for each database DBi.
Suppose that the local machine Lt−1 at the previous iteration
t−1 desired the parameter vector Bt−1,p. As a result, after the
iteration t− 1, the parameter vector Bt−1,p would be updated
into Bt,p. We denote the difference between the vectors Bt,p
and Bt−1,p by ∆t−1. That is, we have
Bt,p = Bt−1,p +∆t−1. (2)
Note that Bt,l = Bt−1,l, ∀l ∈ [r] \ p. The difference vector
∆t−1 also applies to the other parameter vectors, with coeffi-
cient αt−1,l for each l ∈ [r] \ p, where αt−1,p = 1. That is, a
scaled vector αt−1,l∆t−1 is added when encoding B˜t,l. Note
that the coefficients {αt−1,1, αt−1,2, · · · , αt−1,r} are distinct
from each other. As a result, the vector B˜t,l is given as
B˜t,l = Bt−1,l + αt−1,l∆t−1, ∀l ∈ [r]. (3)
We now explain the exclusive data ct−1,i for each i ∈ [N ].
All of the exclusive data ct−1,1, ct−1,2, · · · , ct−1,N across
the databases can be decoded into a message Mt−1. The
message Mt−1 contains the two information elements: the
difference vector ∆t−1 and a coefficient vector αt−1 =
{αt−1,1, αt−1,2, · · · , αt−1,r}, thus implying that
Mt−1 = {αt−1,∆t−1}. (4)
Note that the Mt−1 has r+ s bits. Accordingly, the encoding
of Mt−1 is done with a non-systematic (r + s, r + s)-MDS
code, by the local machine Lt−1, at the previous iteration t−1.
After encoding, r + s encoded bits are equally partitioned
into the exclusive data ct−1,1, ct−1,2, · · · , ct−1,N , each of
which (r + s)/N bits long. Since the data ct−1,i is exclusive
to DBi and the databases do not collude each other, each
database DBi cannot infer Mt−1 in spite of having ct−1,i.
As explained in Section II, an achievable scheme for the
aforementioned system model considers the download, update,
and upload, with respect to the local machine Lt at the iteration
t. We sequentially explain the download phase, update phase,
and upload phase.
A. Download phase
There are two steps in download phase: exclusive data
download and shared data download. The first step is to
download the exclusive data ct−1,i from each database DBi.
Since each exclusive data is a partition of MDS-coded bits,
downloading it from each database does not offer any infor-
mation on the index d to each database in terms of privacy.
Accordingly, in the first step, the local machine Lt only
downloads ct−1,i from DBi without any further download to
ensure privacy. As a result, the amount of download in the
first step is r + s bits.
The second step of download phase is to download the
encoded parameter vector B˜t,d from the databases while
ensuring privacy. As explained in the Section II, the vector
B˜t,d is replicated in every database, unlike the exclusive data
ct,i is stored only in DBi. Furthermore, the local machine Lt
aim to conceal the index d from the databases. As a result,
in the second step, Lt downloads B˜t,d with the conventional
PIR scheme [5] which minimizes the amount of download
for replication-based databases, while ensuring the privacy
on d. From [5], the minimal amount of downloaded bits is




+ · · · + 1
Nr−1
)s = (1 + β)s. Note
that s bits correspond to the desired submodel B˜t,d and βs
bits correspond to the portion of the undeisred submodels
{B˜t,l|l ∈ [r] \ d}, which is additionally downloaded for
ensuring the privacy.
B. Update phase
In the update phase, the local machine Lt updates the
parameter vector Bt,d into Bt+1,d for the next iteration t+1. At
3first, for obtaining Bt,d from B˜t,d, Lt decodes the downloaded
exclusive data ct−1,1, ct−1,2, · · · , ct−1,N into the message
Mt−1 = {αt−1,∆t−1}. Subsequently, Lt obtains Bt,d from
B˜t,d = Bt−1,d + αt−1,l∆t−1. After that, Lt trains the desired
submodel of the parameters Bt,d. Note that Lt does not train
any undesired submodel.
After the training, Lt obtains a new difference vector
∆t = Bt+1,d − Bt,d and generates a new coefficient vector
αt = {αt,1, αt,2, · · · , αt,r}. As the coefficient αt−1,p was 1
in the iteration t− 1, the coefficient αt,d is 1 in the iteration
t. The other coefficients of αt are randomly chosen and dis-
tinct from each other. Subsequently, Lt encodes the message
Mt = {αt,∆t} with a (r+s, r+s)-MDS code, and partitions
the encoded bits into exclusive data ct,1, ct,2, · · · , ct,N . After
encoding, Lt computes r linear combinations of ∆t−1, ∆t,
αt−1, and αt, which are to be uploaded for each submodel.
We specify the linear combinations in the upload phase.
We now characterize the computation overhead. The compu-
tation overhead for training the desired submodel is denoted by
f(s) since the model structure is unspecified. The overheads
for encoding and decoding of a (r + s, r + s)-MDS code are
O((r + s)2) and O((r + s)3), respectively. If a Vandermonde
matrix is used for encoding, the decoding overhead can be
reduced to O((r + s)2).
C. Upload phase
Similar to the download phase, there are two steps in the
upload phase: exclusive data upload and shared data upload.
In the first step, the local machine Lt uploads the exclusive
data ct,i to each DBi where the overhead is r + s bits. As
explained in the download phase, since each exclusive data is
a partition of MDS-coded bits, uploading it to each database
does not offer any information on the index d to each database
in terms of privacy.
In the second step, for each database DBi, the local
machine Lt uploads the aforementioned r linear combinations
of ∆t−1, ∆t, αt−1, and αt, which are denoted by Ut =
{Ut,1, Ut,2, · · · , Ut,r} and specified as follows.
Ut,l = αt,l∆t − αt−1,l∆t−1, ∀l ∈ [r] \ p. (5)
Ut,p = αt,p∆t, l = p. (6)
Recall that αt−1,p = αt,d = 1. After uploading, each DBi
adds Ut,l to B˜t,l. From (3), (5), and (6), this equals to the
encoded vector for the iteration t+ 1, which is given by
B˜t+1,l = Bt,l + αt,l∆t, ∀l ∈ [r].
Note that Bt,l = Bt−1,l, ∀l ∈ [r] \ p. Since Lt uploads r
linear combinations for each database, the overhead of the
second step is rsN bits, thus implying that the communication
overhead in the upload phase is given by rsN + r+ s bits. In
Algorithm 1, the overall process of our achievable scheme is
summarized with respect to Lt.
IV. OVERHEAD COMPARSION
In this section, we compare the overhead of the achievable
scheme explained in the previous section with respect to the
naive approach.
Algorithm 1 The overall process of Lt
procedure DOWNLOAD PHASE
for i = 1 → N do
Step 1. Download ct−1,i from DBi




Decode : {ct−1,i|i ∈ [N ]} →Mt−1
Decode : {Mt−1, B˜t,d} → Bt,d
Learn : Bt,d → Bt+1,d
Update : Mt−1 →Mt
Compute : {Bt,d,Mt−1,Mt} → Ut
Encode : Mt → {ct,i|i ∈ [N ]}
end procedure
procedure UPLOAD PHASE
for i = 1 → N do
Step 1. Upload ct,i to DBi
Step 2. Upload Ut to DBi
end for
end procedure
We first explain the naive approach. In the download phase,
the local machine Lt downloads whole r submodels to ensure
the privacy, thus implying that the overhead is rs bits. We
assume that Lt equally downloads rs/N bits from each
database. In the update phase, Lt trains whole r submodels.
Note that this is due to the two constraints: one is for the
privacy and the other is for the continuity of the federated
learning process. For the privacy, the amount of update for
each submodel need to be identical at each database. On
the other hand, for the continuity, all the updates of the
submodels should be correct. Therefore, we assume that the
naive approach for satisfying both of the constraints is to
download and train all r submodels. In the upload phase, for
each database, Lt uploads the update for whole r submodels,
thus implying that the communication overhead is rsN bits.
We now compare the naive approach with our achievable
scheme. We first compare the communication overhead. For
the download, our achievable scheme downloads r + (2 +
β)s bits, whereas the naive approach downloads rs bits.
Therefore, in many practical scenarios where r and s are
large, our achievable scheme outperforms the naive approach
with respect to the amount of download. For the upload,
our achievable scheme uploads rsN + r + s bits, whereas
the naive approach uploads rsN bits. That is, the naive
approach outperforms our achievable scheme with respect to
the amount of upload. The overall communication overheads
are 2r + (3 + β + rN)s and rs(N + 1) bits, respectively.
Since the difference between the two overheads is given by
(2r + (3 − r + β)s) bits, our achievable scheme generally
outperforms the naive approach for r > 3 with respect to the
overall communication overhead.
We now compare the computation overhead. As explained
in the previous section, there are two kinds of computational
overhead in our achievable scheme. One is the training over-





download r + (2 + β)s rs
upload rsN + r + s rsN
overall 2r + (3 + β + rN)s rs(N + 1)
ing overhead f(s) implies the computation for training one
desired submodel. The encoding/decoding overhead equals to
two times the O((r + s)2) operations. On the other hand,
in the naive approach, only training overhead is considered
where the local machine Lt need to train whole r submodels.
Note that each submodels has s parameters and therefore
the computation overhead is given by rf(s). Therefore, in
practical, in spite of encoding/decoding overhead, it is obvious
that our achievable scheme outperforms the naive approach
with respect to the computation overhead. We summarize the
comparison in Table 1.
V. PRIVACY PROOF AND OPTIMALITY ANALYSIS
A. Privacy proof
For the privacy proof, we show that the constraint (1) is
satisfied for every database. By the chain rule, the constraint
(1) for DBi becomes as follows.
I(d;Qt,i) + I(d; St,i|Qt,i) + I(d;Ut,i|Qt,i, St,i) = 0.
We show that each of three terms equals to 0. We first show
that St,i = Bt ∪ ct−1,i is independent to d. Since the local
machine Lt determines d before downloading any parameter,
Lt does not have any information about St,i when determining
d, thus implying that I(d; St,i|Qt,i) = 0.
We now show that the third term equals to 0. The uploaded
data Ut,i has two elements: ct,i and Ut. Recalling that the
exclusive data ct,i for DBi is a partition of non-systematic
MDS-coded Mt = {αt,∆t}, DBi cannot specify Mt by
















By mathematical induction, we show that (7) is underdeter-
mined. For the first iteration t = 1, (7) would be U1 = α
T
1 ∆1.
Since both of α1 and ∆1 are generated by the first local
machine L1, they are unknown to the databases, thus implying
that every database cannot solve the system U1 = α
T
1 ∆1.
For the iteration t − 1, we assume that the system Ut−1 =
αTt−1∆t−1−α
T
t−2∆t−2 is underdetermined, thus implying that
αt−1 and ∆t−1 remain unknown to the databases. As a result,
at iteration t, the vectors αt−1 and ∆t−1 are unknown from
the previous iteration and the vectors αt and ∆t are generated
by the local machine Lt. Since all of the vectors αt, αt−1,
∆t, and ∆t−1 are unknown to each database DBi, the system
(7) is also underdetermined. Therefore, the uploaded data Ut,i
does not give any information on d to DBi, thus implying that
I(d;Ut,i|Qt,i, St,i) = 0.
We now show that the queries Qt,i does not give any
information about d. In our achievable scheme, there are four
kinds of queries : downloading ct−1,i and B˜t,d, uploading
ct,i and Ut. According to the queries for downloading ct−1,i,
and uploading ct,i and Ut, Lt merely downloads and uploads
whole content of ct−1,i, ct,i, and Ut which is independent to
d. Therefore, it is obvious that these three kinds of queries
does not give any information on d.
We now consider the queries for downloading B˜t,d. Recall
that we adopt the conventional PIR scheme [5] for download-
ing parameter vector B˜t,d, which has been proven to ensure
privacy, thus implying that I(d;Qt,i) = 0.
B. Optimality analysis
In this section, we characterize the lower bound of over-
heads. As for download overhead, it has been proven that the
PIR scheme in [5] achieves the minimum amount of download,
(1+β)s. Compared to the lower bound, our achievable scheme
requires r + s more bits for download. As for computation
overhead, it is obvious that the minimum is f(s), which is
the same as for the case where the privacy does not have to
be considered. Compared to the lower bound, our achievable
scheme requires 2O((r + s)2) more bits for encoding and
decoding.
We now show that the lower bound for upload overhead
equals rsN bits. That is, for each database, the amount of
uploaded bits should be more than rs bits. For the desired sub-
model, the local machine uploads s bits for parameter update.
Since there should be no difference among the submodels, the
local machine should upload s bits for the other undesired
submodels. Therefore, the minimum amount of uploaded bits
for each database equals to rs bits, as we claim. Compared to
the lower bound, our achievable scheme requires r + s more
bits for uploading.
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